Why Subsidiarity Could Save the Russian Federation
In late June 2026, drivers in Chita, capital of Russia’s Zabaykalsky Krai in remote eastern Siberia, found themselves trapped in multi-kilometre queues towards fuel stations. They are after petrol or diesel. Some waited seven or eight hours; others slept in their cars. This city of roughly 330,000 people sits more than 4,500 kilometers from Kyiv in Ukraine. That is farther than the distance from Paris to Moscow. Yet the fuel shortage paralyzing daily life in Chita traces directly back to Ukrainian long-range drone strikes on Russian oil refineries.
On a closer look, the scenes in Chita expose a deeper structural failure: the Russian Federation’s over-centralized, Moscow-dominated model of governance. Essentially, that means hegemony. What looks like a war-induced inconvenience is in reality a symptom of imperial-style hegemony that concentrates decisions about critical infrastructure, resource extraction, allocation and use in the centre of Moscow, leaving vast peripheral regions dangerously exposed.
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Ukraine’s 2026 drone offensive (strike campaign) has targeted refineries across Russia, from the Moscow region’s Kapotnya plant (a major supplier for the capital) to facilities in Tatarstan, Ufa and elsewhere. It has had significant ripple effects. Analysts estimate that repeated hits have taken more than 20% of Russia’s refining capacity offline at peak periods, with secondary processing units especially vulnerable.
The result is a spreading domestic fuel crisis affecting more than 50 regions in the Russian Federation. Rationing, price spikes and long queues have become commonplace. Remote areas like Chita and the broader Transbaikal suffer disproportionately because fuel must travel enormous distances from centralized production hubs, many closer to Moscow. Agriculture faces diesel shortages ahead of harvest, and transport and logistics are strained. Ordinary citizens bear the brunt.
These drone strikes succeed precisely because Russia’s energy system is optimized for centralized control rather than resilience. A handful of large refineries serve the entire federation. Damage one node, and the effects cascade across thousands of kilometers. It shows hegemony’s fatal flaw, which is that centralization means vulnerability. The Russian Federation presents itself as a federal state, yet in practice it operates as a highly centralized hegemonic system. Power, resources, and major infrastructure decisions flow from Moscow. Regional governors often act as extensions of the centre rather than autonomous actors. This model served expansionist and control purposes historically, but it creates single points of failure in the 21st century.
When Ukrainian drones strike refineries near the European part of Russia, the pain reaches Siberia and the Far East because there is insufficient decentralized production or regional stockpiling. Local authorities in places like Chita have limited tools to mitigate the crisis quickly; they depend on directives and supplies from the centre. The war has simply accelerated and exposed what sanctions and economic geography had already strained. The Russian Federation works (and now doesn’t work so well) on classic hegemonic overreach: the centre extracts loyalty and resources from the periphery while providing uneven protection and services in return. Remote regions subsidize the core through taxes and manpower for the war effort, yet receive inadequate buffers against disruptions originating far away.
European Union (EU) style subsidiarity would serve the Russian Federation much better. The EU’s principle of subsidiarity offers a compelling alternative model for Russia. Under subsidiarity, decisions are taken at the lowest effective level of governance, i.e. from local or regional where possible, to national or supranational only when necessary. It promotes resilience through diversity of economic enterprises, local knowledge and distributed capacity of all sorts across large geographical areas.
Applied to the Russian Federation, subsidiarity would mean, at least:
- Empowering federal subjects (sub-states) to develop and manage more of their own energy infrastructure, including smaller-scale or regional refineries suited to local needs.
- Allowing regions greater fiscal and regulatory autonomy to build diversified supply chains, strategic reserves and alternative energy sources closer to consumption centres.
- Reducing the systemic risk of centralized chokepoints that current drone strikes exploit so effectively.
A more subsidiary Russian Federation would not dissolve into chaos; successful federations and the EU itself demonstrate that layered governance can enhance stability and adaptability. Regions like Zabaykalsky Krai, with proximity to China and Mongolia and their own resource base, could pursue tailored energy strategies rather than waiting for Moscow’s one-size-fits-all approach. This would make the country far more resilient to external shocks, whether they be drone strikes, sanctions or regional or global market shifts. Critically, subsidiarity aligns incentives better. Local leaders accountable to their populations would prioritize practical resilience over distant geopolitical ambitions.
A Russian Federation that invests in distributed energy security would have less need, or appetite, for risky external adventures that ultimately boomerang on its own citizens. This is what is now effectively happening due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The current conflict has become an unintended though necessary review of Russia’s governance model!
Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure are not merely military tactics; they reveal how hegemony concentrates vulnerability. Moscow’s ability to shield the core while projecting power outward comes at the expense of the periphery’s security and the system’s overall robustness. All areas of the Russian Federation possess immense human, natural and geographic resources. Reorganizing along more subsidiary lines, by strengthening genuine federalism with real regional autonomy in key economic sectors, could unlock that potential without requiring external conquest or perpetual central coercion. It would make the federation more like a resilient network. Currently, it is more like a brittle empire, which though has been the case in various periods of Russian history, and led to failures and collapses.
It is clear that the fuel lines in Chita are not just about basic transport needs. They are a warning that centralized hegemony, especially when combined with prolonged conflict, ultimately undermines the very state it seeks to preserve. A Russian Federation that embraced subsidiarity would be stronger internally, more adaptive externally, and better positioned to deliver prosperity to all its diverse regions that spread from the Baltic to the Pacific.
The choice for subsidiarity is structural as much as it is strategic. Continuing down the path of hyper-centralized control risks repeating and amplifying self-inflicted crises. Moving toward genuine subsidiarity offers a path to real strength. The images from Chita suggest the current model is running on empty.
