Europe has historically pursued cooperative security arrangements, balancing military alliances with diplomatic and multilateral efforts to prevent conflict and manage crises. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has played a central role in this effort, alongside other security frameworks. In this regard, Europe has not been dependent on NATO alone or that NATO is the only mechanism for European security.
European security has never solely relied on military buildup; instead, it has consistently pursued diplomatic and multilateral mechanisms to reduce tensions, prevent conflict, and foster cooperation. Rather than being dependent only on military alliances like NATO, Europe has consistently built cooperative security arrangements, particularly through the OSCE. The OSCE is Europe’s key cooperative security institution. It is the world’s largest regional security organization, comprising 57 participating states, including European nations, the USA, Canada, and Russia.
The OSCE originated from the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which sought to reduce Cold War tensions through cooperation in:
- Political-military security, via arms control, confidence-building measures, and military transparency.
- Economic and environmental cooperation, by addressing economic disparities and environmental security risks.
- Human rights and democracy, by promoting fundamental freedoms and election monitoring.
The OSCE has strengthened European cooperative security by:
- Confidence-building measures, which is done by military transparency mechanisms, such as mutual inspections of military forces and notification of military exercises. The Vienna Document (1990, revised 2011) requires OSCE members to notify each other about military activities to prevent miscalculations.
- Conflict prevention and mediation, to prevent violent escalations in regions like the Balkans, Moldova, and Central Asia. OSCE mediators also engaged in diplomatic efforts in Ukraine following the 2014 crisis (annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation).
- Election monitoring and human rights, through OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which monitors elections to prevent electoral fraud. This promotes democratic governance and rule of law, and helped Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
- Arms control agreements, in that OSCE helped negotiate post-Cold War arms reduction treaties, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990), and the Open Skies Treaty (1992) which allows mutual aerial surveillance to prevent war.
OSCE and Europe’s cooperative security approach matter because Europe has historically relied on negotiation and security agreements rather than pure militarization. In this regard, the OSCE provides a platform where even adversarial states (e.g. Russia, and the USA) can engage in security dialogue. This shows that Europe’s approach is not binary (military buildup versus disarmament); rather it has always blended diplomacy, arms control, and limited defence mechanisms.
Europe has always prioritized cooperative security, blending military deterrence with diplomacy. The OSCE remains one of Europe’s most important institutions for conflict prevention, arms control, and human rights protection. Rather than choosing between U.S. military dominance or total disarmament, Europe has sought a more sophisticated approach that includes OSCE diplomacy, EU security policies, and NATO deterrence.
Russia’s Formal NATO Relationship
Far from being an inherently antagonistic force, NATO established a formal partnership with Russia through the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. Signed just seven years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, this agreement explicitly addressed Russian security concerns, with NATO pledging not to treat Russia as an adversary or station nuclear weapons and substantial combat forces in new member states. For decades, this partnership facilitated active security dialogue, with Russian officials even stationed at NATO headquarters since 2002 to ensure smooth coordination.
This intricate cooperation undermines claims of NATO deliberately provoking Russia through eastward expansion. Rather, any perception of threat from NATO’s growth reflects a broader geopolitical reality: military expansion by any nation can unsettle neighbours, yet the NATO-Russia framework was designed to mitigate such tensions (which it did well), not exacerbate them.
The notion that NATO’s actions—particularly regarding Ukraine—constitute clear provocation is equally shaky. Ukraine’s path to NATO membership was never assured, hindered by political and diplomatic obstacles since the Soviet collapse. NATO’s support for Ukraine, especially post-2014, has been defensive, aimed at bolstering a partner against aggression rather than signaling expansionist intent. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, was not some kind of random event, but a strategic escalation, not an inevitable outcome of NATO’s posture.
Meanwhile, Europe’s broader security architecture, exemplified by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), includes Russia and Belarus, and promotes military transparency through measures like annual information exchanges and inspections—mechanisms Russia itself abandoned in 2023. This cooperative legacy suggests that conflict stems less from NATO’s inherent hostility and more from strategic choices by individual actors, namely Putin.
Vienna Document 2011
The Vienna Document 2011 is a politically binding agreement among 57 OSCE participating states, including Russia, designed to enhance military transparency and reduce the risk of conflicts through measures such as the annual exchange of military information, prior notification of certain military activities, and compliance verification through inspections.
But what about Russia’s compliance with the Vienna Document? In February 2023, Russia refused to share data on its military forces during the annual exchange mandated by the Vienna Document. This marked a significant departure from its previous commitments and was viewed as undermining European security frameworks. The Vienna Document requires participating states to notify others of certain military activities, especially those exceeding specific thresholds (e.g. 9,000 troops). However, Russia conducted large-scale military exercises without the required notifications, which it has done by exploiting loopholes by segmenting exercises to fall below notification thresholds. There have also been instances where Russia denied inspection requests under the Vienna Document. For example, in January 2022, Latvia’s request to inspect the “Allied Resolve” military exercises conducted by Russia and Belarus was rejected by Russia, raising concerns about its commitment to transparency.
Efforts to update and strengthen the Vienna Document have faced challenges, with Russia expressing reluctance to adopt proposed enhancements aimed at increasing military transparency and risk reduction. This has been the case since at least 2019. See: Vienna Document 2011 Update Awaiting Better Days at https://shrmonitor.org/vienna-document-2011-update/. So, while Russia has historically participated in the Vienna Document’s mechanisms, recent actions indicate a shift away from full compliance, raising obvious concerns about the effectiveness of this confidence- and security-building measure in ensuring transparency and stability in the region.
